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Abstract
We study product innovation and imitation in the market of corporate underwriting with
a dynamic model where client switching costs and the bankers’ expertise in deal structuring
characterize the life cycle of a security. While the clientele loyalty allows positive rent extraction,
the superior expertise can account for the documented market leadership of the innovator. As
expertise on product structuring is acquired by imitators, the innovator’s market share advantage
decreases. Also, the speed of entry by imitators increases for later generation products. Our
predictions are consistent with well documented evidence on the market share leadership of
innovators. We also present new evidence from equity-linked and derivative corporate products
that supports the dynamic predictions of our learning model.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G24, L12, L89.
Keywords: Innovation and imitation, ﬁrst-mover advantages, product diﬀerentiation, learn-
ing.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Investment banks have been at the forefront of ﬁnancial innovation in the last two decades, in-
creasing the number of security designs that issuing ﬁrms can use to raise new money. The volume
of cash that banks underwrite using these products has also taken an increasing proportion of the
overall underwriting market. But innovation is often followed by imitation and even large banks of
big reputations avoid expenditures in research and development and compete vis à vis the innovator
with an imitation of the original product. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests quite strongly that
the developers of new securities are able to preserve a competitive advantage over their imitators.
Why this is the case is still an open question in the ﬁnance ﬁeld. It is important and timely to study
the source and the evolution of the developer’s advantage if we want to understand the incentives
of banks to innovate, how these incentives aﬀect the speed of innovation and, in turn, how the
protection of innovation through patent laws may aﬀect these incentives.1
Peter Tufano’s seminal empirical study of innovation in corporate products showed that in-
vestment banks that develop new corporate products enjoy a market share leadership over equally
reputed rivals (Tufano, 1989).2 Thus, despite the fact that imitators are oﬀering similar products,
as i g n i ﬁcant share of the issuing ﬁrms are more likely to choose the innovator as their underwriter.
One reason they may have such a preference is that the imitator can underwrite deals with only
an imperfect version of the product. In fact, for many product innovations, the reverse engineering
often does not result in a perfect substitute (Toy, 2001).3 Similarly, in their study of the investment
1It is widely recognized that patents have been ineﬀective ways of protection from competition by imitators
in ﬁnance. While it was always possible to obtain a patent on an innovative corporate product, it was virtually
impossible to enforce the patent before 1999, as most ﬁnancial innovations are considered “business methods or
formulas”. Under patent laws, business methods were unpatentable until the US Supreme Court upheld a patent on
a “business method” in 1999. It is believed that the State Street Case has set the precedent required to make patents
eﬀective to protect R&D in ﬁnancial products development.
2Thorough surveys of innovations in corporate ﬁnance instruments are provided by Peter Tufano (Tufano, 1995)
and John Finnerty (Finnerty, 1992). A more comprehensive survey of ﬁnancial innovation in general is provided by
Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale (Allen and Gale, 1994).
3This view that imitations are imperfect substitutes is summarized in the testimony by William Toy, a Managing
2banking industry, Dwight Eccles and Robert Crane argue that the skill to structure the issue of a
corporate security takes time to acquire (Eccles and Crane, 1988). These views suggest that the
innovator is eﬀectively the expert underwriter, and the competitors are imperfect imitators.
This paper argues that the innovator has an advantage over the imitator that consists of a
superior expertise in structuring a complex security for any given client. The innovator acquires
the expertise about the new security during its the development stage, whereas an imitator cannot
reverse-engineer it perfectly or acquire the innovator’s expertise instantly after the new security
is marketed. To back our claim we build a model of the underwriting market around this main
feature and then test the validity of its empirical predictions with the existing empirical evidence
of ﬁnancial innovation, and with new evidence that we provide here.
To our knowledge very few researchers try to answer why ﬁrms may have a preference for the
innovator rather than the imitator.4Our model considers the fact that the imitators do not have
the same expertise as the innovator initially but may acquire it as more deals are being completed.
Thus, the model characterizes the timing of the entry of imitators and the pricing behavior before
and after imitation. It has distinctive dynamic implications that are comparable with existing and
new evidence on ﬁnancial innovation. as more issues of the innovative security are underwritten and
imitators perfect their own expertise, the innovator’s advantage decreases and eventually disappears
as the innovation approaches a commodity product status. This dynamic pattern suggests that the
innovator’s proﬁts are eroded gradually along the life cycle of new ﬁnancial products (see Van
Horne, 1985).
The theoretical part of the paper is a duopoly model, i.e., an innovator vs. an imitator, where the
comparative statics show that the smaller the innovator’s quality advantage the faster the imitators
Director at CDC Capital:
“There is at least a perception that the ﬁrst mover is more familiar with the product he issues than the imitator,”
(William Toy, personal interview, New York City, February 2001).
4In a recent survey, Peter Tufano argues that many mechanisms that reward innovation still remain to be studied
(Tufano, 2003).
3enter the market and the faster the market shares of innovators and imitators converge. Intuitively,
the more highly structured is the product the harder it is to reverse-engineer and the longer the
innovator can maintain its market share advantage. To verify empirically these predictions we look
into innovations that can be classiﬁed into product groups and generations of products within a
group according to the relationship of a product to its predecessors (i.e., the prior art). We ﬁnd such
type of innovations in the equity-linked and derivatives class of the Securities Data Company New
Issues Database. This class of products has become increasingly important, not only as a fertile
ground for innovation in corporate products, but also as a large source of funds: between 1985 and
2002, ﬁrms have raised over US$ 200 billion, which represents almost 16% of the cash that was raised
using common stock. For the case of equity-linked securities, some products are radically innovative
while others are only enhancements of previous products. Since a later generation product builds on
the prior security designs, i.e., is less innovative than a ﬁrst generation product, it could be reverse-
engineered more eﬀectively. Thus, the initial expertise advantage of the ﬁrst-mover is expected to
be stronger in ﬁrst generation products than on later generations. Indeed, for the later generation
products our model predicts faster imitation and faster market share convergence than for earlier
generation products. We ﬁnd that the theoretical predictions on the speed of imitation match the
empirical evidence on equity linked securities that we present.
This paper relates to the work of Sugato Bhattacharyya and Vikram Nanda on the role of
switching costs in ﬁnancial innovation (Bhattacharyya and Nanda, 2000). They show that a po-
tential innovator can charge underwriting fees over marginal costs to loyal clients who face costs
to switching to other banks. Thus, banks endowed with a broader or more loyal client base can
proﬁt more in new markets. While client loyalty certainly aﬀects the innovator’s proﬁts they may
not eliminate the free-rider problem. If client loya l t yw e r et h eo n l ys o u r c eo fr e n te x t r a c t i o nt h e n
any potential innovator would rather be an imitator than develop, save the development costs and
still underwrite the security for its loyal clientele at a premium. In other words, the advantage
belongs to the second mover rather than to the ﬁrst. Our model exhibits the developer’s expertise
advantage feature together with the switching costs feature. Innovators and imitators compete with
4products that are diﬀerentiated horizontally and vertically. The horizontal dimension represents
the switching costs and the vertical dimension represents the innovator’s expertise in structuring
deals. The vertical dimension is crucial to account for the stylized facts in the literature and the
new evidence provided here. The diﬀerent expertise advantages across subsequent generations of a
family of innovations accounts for the faster expected timing of entry of imitation and the faster
speed of convergence of market shares for later generations that our data show. It is important to
stress that other explanations that do not rely on the developer’s expertise can hardly explain the
dynamic pattern of the decreasing market share advantage of the innovator and the faster speed of
entry in equity-linked securities.
Our model can also address the interactions between the size of switching costs or the size of
initial clienteles and the incentives to innovate. As in the model by Bhattacharyya and Nanda, our
model predicts that banks with smaller initial clienteles may never innovate. In fact, we do see
in the data that competition in derivative corporate products involves mostly the “bulge bracket”
Wall Street banks. However, innovators do not appear to have large market shares only because
of their large initial clienteles: we also observe that within the group of large banks, they are
sometimes leaders and other times followers. Enrique Schroth estimates the demand function for a
given underwriter and ﬁnds that the leadership is systematic to the innovator, even after controlling
for the size of the clientele of the bank (Schroth, 2003). Thus, even large banks also have small
market shares, and this is generally when they are imitators.
Our analysis has implications too about the speed at which innovations are introduced. In-
novator’s may have an idea for a marketable security, but may not oﬀer it as soon as they have
it. In our model, this happens because the arrival of issuing ﬁrms is random, so even if the bank
has completed the design privately, there may not be any close clients looking for external ﬁnance.
Underwriting the security with a distant client is not very proﬁtable because the client is switch-
ing away from his bank. Moreover, it triggers the competitor’s learning process by the imitators
too soon. Thus, our model predicts that innovators will wait for good clients to come to market,
or, market their innovations aggressively to their clients, or, alternatively, innovate based on their
5clients’ capital structure targets.
The proﬁts of innovation in our model increase when imitators cannot learn too much infor-
mation about optimal product engineering from each deal. Banks innovate more often in markets
where inference about the optimal engineering by the imitator is clouded by a changing economic
environment, i.e., a higher volatility. Innovation is more frequent in volatile markets not because
ﬁrms demand new products to hedge risks but because innovating banks will expect larger ﬁrst-
mover advantages there.
John Persons and Vincent Warther propose a theory of the adoption of ﬁnancial innovations
that explains some documented cases of boom and bust cycles (Persons and Warther, 1997). In
their model, issuing ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated in terms of their cost of adopting an innovation of
uncertain value. At every period, all ﬁr m st h a th a v en o ty e tb e e nﬁnanced will choose to use the
innovation as a ﬁnancing instrument if its expected value exceeds its cost. The expected value to
the non-adopters is updated after a noisy signal of the true value is revealed from those that had
adopted it. Since the precision of this signal would depend on the total number of adopters, they
can generate waves of adoption in equilibrium. Our model is diﬀerent in several respects. In ﬁrst
place, our model diﬀers in the timing: here one client is drawn independently at each time, while in
their model, all ﬁrms are potential issuers every period. We chose to model the market this way in
order to exploit fully the available data on new issues of corporate derivatives: the data is recorded
deal by deal, and banks bid for each underwriting deal at a time. Therefore, the model can make
predictions of the future expected market shares after each deal is completed. But most crucially,
their model abstracts from competition between rival banks while ours focuses precisely in the
demand for the underwriting services of diﬀerent competing banks and the relative advantage of
the innovator over its imitator across time. Finally, in our model the size of the aggregate demand
for the new product is ﬁxed every period (i.e., one client at a time). Allowing for changes in the
demand every period may not aﬀect signiﬁcantly our predictions in terms of the relative advantage
of one bank over the other, or the speed of entry by imitators.
We proceed with Section 2, where we describe the elements of the model, and explain how
6imitation may be imperfect. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium when the innovator and the
imitator have identical underwriting market shares before the innovation is introduced, and Section
4 formalizes the acquisition of underwriting expertise by the imitator. Section 5 pins down the
equilibrium proﬁts of innovation and discusses the incentives to innovate. Section 6 generalizes
the results to the case where the competitors have initially asymmetric client bases and reputation
is accumulated throughout the product’s life. Section 7 tests the predictions with existing and
new evidence found in the underwriting market of equity-linked and corporate derivative products.
Section 8 summarizes brieﬂy.
2 The Setup of the Model
2.1 The Underwriting Market
In this section we model the market of corporate underwriting. There are two types of underwriters:
the innovator and the imitator. Each type oﬀers its own variety of a corporate ﬁnance product,
i.e., a structured security, that ﬁrms can issue to raise funds. The innovator is the bank that ﬁrst
developed a new security design and competes with the imitator to underwrite every issue of the
innovative security by a given ﬁrm. Let the underwriters be indexed by i, the innovator is i =0
and the imitator is i =1 . The case with more imitators is developed in the appendix and produces
the same qualitative results. An underwriter is hired by an issuer to structure the deal and sell the
securities to investors. The underwriter charges its client a fee, i.e., the underwriting spread, for
such a service.
The game starts at period 0 when the innovator (i =0 )gets an idea about a new corporate
security design. The potential innovator can choose to develop and market the new security by
paying a ﬁxed R&D cost, F0. As soon as it chooses to innovate, it starts underwriting issues of
the new security. After the innovator completes is ﬁrst underwriting deal, information about the
security design is revealed. With this information, the other bank can develop a similar product
and become an imitator. We assume that the imitator can free-ride completely the R&D, that
7is, F1 =0 .5The innovator is a monopolist only for the ﬁr s td e a l .A f t e rt h a td e a l ,t h ep r e s e n c eo f
imitation limits his market power as both banks compete in underwriting spreads.
The underwriting service provided by banks is diﬀerentiated, both vertically and horizontally.
The vertical dimension measures the quality of the product: all other things constant, any issuer
derives a higher value if she hires an investment bank that provides a higher quality underwriting.
The horizontal dimension describes the preferences of issuers for a particular bank. Issuers are
“located” on a unit interval, and their mass is distributed over it following a given distribution.
For now we assume that the distribution of issuers is uniform over [0,1] and relax this assumption
in Section 6. At every period nature draws the next ﬁrm who will seek for an underwriting deal
from the said distribution. We assume that the two competing investment banks in this economy
oﬀer diﬀerentiated varieties and are located at the two extremes of the interval (without loss of
generality, the innovator is located at 0; see Figure 1 for an illustration).
Let the quality of underwriter i’s product be qi and assume that the preference for quality,
location and the price paid, pi, enter linearly into the ﬁrm’s valuation of an underwriting deal.
Then, the values of a client located at x of hiring either type of banker as its underwriter are given
by:
u0(x)=q0 − p0 − sx,
u1(x)=q1 − p1 − s(1 − x),
where s is the cost per unit of distance of choosing a variety located away from the preferred one.6
Note that with this setup each bank will have its own clientele of ﬁnancing ﬁrms. The value
to a ﬁrm of adopting the product of bank 0 or 1 depends on relative prices, on the quality of
the product, but also on the proximity of the bank’s variety to its preferred one. The horizontal
5We could relax this extreme assumption to F0 >F 1 > 0. This would only strengthen the innovator’s advantage
and not change at all the comparative statics.
6Note that the price, p, is not the price at which the issue of the new security is sold by the client to investors,
but the price that the client pays to the bank (innovator or imitator) for the engineering of the new security. It is
thus the underwriting fee.
8dimension represents then the degree of loyalty that issuing ﬁrms have to the available underwriters
since a ﬁrm always belongs to a given bank’s clientele and it faces a cost of switching bankers. Thus,
hereafter we refer to s as the size of the switching cost or the loyalty of the client interchangeably.7
Every time a ﬁrm is drawn, she chooses its underwriter, i, to maximize the value of its contract,
ui. We assume that the issuing ﬁrm has a reservation value normalized to zero and cannot delay
the ﬁnancing decision. After a ﬁrm is drawn, both banks compete in prices to sign an underwriting
deal with her. Given the ﬁrm type, qualities, and switching costs, each banker’s per-deal proﬁts
are:
πi =( pi − c)Di(x,p0,p 1,x,q 0,q 1,s,t) (1)
for i =0 ,1. The term c represents the marginal cost of underwriting (e.g., SEC ﬁling, advertising,
legal fees) and t the order of the draw, i.e., the security has a history of t−1 deals. Only one bank





1 if u0(x) >u 1(x),
0 otherwise,
D1 =1 − D0.
At period zero, the expected proﬁts to the innovator are:
Πe






0(0) denotes the innovator’s expected proﬁts in the ﬁrst deal, which he gets for sure being
still the only issuer. Note that most innovations in corporate security designs are ﬁnite-lived. The
inﬁnite-horizon assumption is a natural way to model the problem if we introduce the probability
that the game continues for one more period as a discount factor, which we call (1−δ). To save in
7We consider only the type of switching costs where ﬁrms are more likely to choose a bank with which they have
had relationships in the past in other lines of business, i.e., where banks have a loyal clientele from the outset. Client
loyalty might also be developed during the life cycle of an innovation. However, we do not model this other source of
client stickyness because it does not allow a better interpretation of the data: no ﬁrm has issued the same security
more than once.
9notation we have excluded the “pure time” discount factor. However, this can be easily incorporated
to the model if we interpret (1 − δ) as the product of the probability of continuation and the pure
time discount.
2.2 Financial Innovation
An innovation is a new corporate security that a ﬁrm can issue to raise money. Due to disclosure
regulations, the design of the new security is revealed to imitators. However, this design typically
has several parameters that have to be set for each deal. For example, among other things, a
PERCs (Preferred Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock) issue has to specify the conversion rate
of preferred to common shares as a function of the returns of common stock, by choosing a cap
to the appreciation, r. The contract also must specify the dividends paid and the sale price (see
Figure 2).8
A bank that wants to imitate PERCs can see what is the general structure of the product but
still does not know how to set optimally for his client the speciﬁc parameters of the security such
as caps, conversion rates and price. For this reason a client who decides to issue PERCs would
expect a higher quality of underwriting from the original developer of the security, all other things
being equal.
Similarly, generic equity-linked debt products must specify the stock or stock index whose
price is tied to the adjustable face value. Thus, to underwrite an issue of any given security, the
underwriter has to structure each deal by customizing the parameters speciﬁed by the design.9Deal
customization has been well documented. It is depicted in testimonies by bankers collected by
Eccles and Crane (Eccles and Crane, 1988). Recently, Schroth analyzes the structuring of equity-
linked deals and ﬁnds a signiﬁcant variation across the parameters within same designs (Schroth,
2003).
We assume that the skill needed to customize deals is acquired with expertise. If the innovator
8PERCs are shares of preferred stock that are mandatorily convertible to common stock after 3 years.
9A notable example of an equity-linked bond is Salomon Brother’s invention, the ELK, a bond whose face value
is pegged to the appreciation of a chosen traded stock.
10has superior expertise than the imitator he structures the deals better and, ceteris paribus,h e
provides a higher quality underwriting. We let the investment banks’s expertise be q, the quality
parameter of the product. While the imitator can learn the design structure immediately and for
free, he may only be able to imitate the innovator’s new product imperfectly or with an inferior
customizing skill than the innovator. In such case, q0 >q 1, and let ∆q ≡ q0 −q1 ≥ 0 be the quality
diﬀerential.
The characteristic of corporate derivatives that we highlight in this paper is that the product
design does not disclose immediately all the private information of the innovator. We believe
that other prominent ﬁnancial vehicles share these features. For example, Goldman pioneered and
remained the lead underwriter of puttable securities indexed to the Nikkei Index. The idea of
issuing Nikkei Put warrants was disclosed rapidly to competitors but Goldman also hedged the
issuer’s exposure to the Nikkei discretionally, proﬁting from private knowledge acquired during the
development of the hybrid security.
Some anecdotal evidence also exhibits similar features to the corporate products in our study.
Thackray (1985), for example, documents how Drexel, Burnham, Lambert did not disclose its
“junk-bond” prospectuses to Wall Street insiders because of fears that competitor’s imitations
may challenge their lead in the market for underwriting high-yield debt. J.P. Morgan’s lead in
underwriting asset-backed securities using its so called BISTRO variety of a collateralized loan
obligation arguably hinges on the discretion with which it manages the pool of assets used as
collateral (Roper, 1999). Thus, while data is not available we would expect to observe similar
patterns of innovation and imitation in highly structured debt products, such as credit derivatives,
collateralized loans and asset-backed obligations.
3 Equilibrium
We assume that q1, which is smaller than q0, is large enough to guarantee that the ex-post proﬁts
to the innovator or the imitator from a deal with any potential client are positive if either were a
monopolist. Thus, we assume that
11q1 ≥ c + s. (2)
In the ﬁrst deal, the innovator is a monopolist and makes a certain proﬁt πM. After the ﬁrst deal
the innovator loses part of its market power.
After the ﬁrst deal, underwriters compete for the following client that wants to issue the new
security. Banks compete by undercutting prices until one of them reaches its marginal cost. Deﬁne
ˆ x as the client that, when oﬀered a deal priced at marginal cost by both banks, is indiﬀerent between
either. That is, ˆ x equates u0(ˆ x) and u1(ˆ x) for p0 = p1 = c. Solving, we obtain








The value of ˆ x denotes the location (loyalty) of the indiﬀerent client. Whenever the innovator’s
quality advantage is high relative to the clientele eﬀect, i.e., ∆q>s , then the “indiﬀerent” client
lies outside the unit interval and the innovator gets the next deal for sure. Still, the presence of the
imitative competitor puts a bound on the markup that the innovator can obtain.
Let x =m i n( 1 , ˆ x). Figure 3 illustrates the probability that either competitor obtains the next
deal as a function of the quality advantage, ∆q.For any client x ∈ [0,x) the innovator can undercut
the imitator’s price below its break-even level, making the the client indiﬀerent and thus getting
the deal while making a proﬁt). The innovator’s price is solves:
q0 − p0 − sx = q1 − c − s(1 − x),
⇒ p0 = c +( 1− 2x)s + ∆q.
Similarly, an imitator gets any client x ∈ [x,1] and prices the deal at
p1 = c +( 2 x − 1)s − ∆q.



































The innovator’s expected proﬁts are higher, due to the higher quality. In fact, πe
0 − πe
1 = ∆q and
∆q>0 as long as the imitator cannot reverse engineer the innovation perfectly.As the quality
advantage vanishes for uniformly distributed clients the probabilities of obtaining the deal converge
to one half for both competitors and the expected proﬁts are equal.
The quality diﬀerential is a crucial element of innovation in this model. The model exhibits the
typical free-rider problem in product innovation because the security design is disclosed publicly
and F1 <F 0. However, deals have to be customized within the design of the product, and this
leaves room for quality diﬀerences. In the next section we formalize how expertise is acquired as
deals are completed and the innovation develops into a commodity.
4 The Acquisition of Product Expertise
We now focus on the learning process that describes the dynamics of ∆q. We use the dynamics of
the expertise acquired by both competing banks to analyze the underwriting game equilibrium and
make comparative statics predictions.
An imitator can improve his deal structuring from the moment he observes the new security.
He acquires product expertise as more deals on that security are completed in the market. Let
the expertise speciﬁc to a given security be summarized by the knowledge of a variable, a.T o
understand better the meaning of a, consider the following factors that aﬀect the quality of the
underwriting service: (i) the underwriter must learn how to choose the right parameters that are
best for diﬀerent issuers; (ii) investment banks need to identify changes in the tastes of investors
or changes in market conditions and structure each issue accordingly to maximize the proceeds;
13and (iii) underwriters also provide advice to issuers on how to hedge the liabilities or to invest
the proceeds associated to the issue of the securities they engineer. In fact, in some cases the
underwriters may buy some of the issued shares, in which case they need to understand the product’s
eﬀect on the risk and returns of a portfolio.10 The innovator may provide a superior quality
underwriting by improving his knowledge on all these dimensions during the development process.
Additionally, his superior expertise may come from: (iv) the innovator contacting potential issuers
before the ﬁr s td e a lt oh a v eal e g - u po nt h eﬁrst few deals, (v) the innovator having its lawyers
sign-oﬀ on the documentation while an imitator would have to get used to the legal or tax risks
before the deal is presented to clients, or (vi) the innovator having collected prior information in
potential investors’ demand in the secondary markets.11
Thus, we can think of a as a mapping parameter of these changing conditions (clients, markets,
investors, own investments) to the optimal deal structure. A higher quality is tied to a superior
product or market expertise, which is itself a better knowledge of a. Formally, product expertise is
the precision of the information that the underwriter has about the unknown value of a. The prior
density of a is normally distributed with variance A−1. In the case of the innovator, R&D provides
him information about a through a signal:
z0 = a + ε0, (3)
where the noise component ε0 is a normally distributed variable with E(ε0)=0and Va r(ε0)=τ−1.
Bayesian updating gives the posterior precision or the knowledge of the innovator about the
engineering choice a:
q0 = A + τ
we identify this precision with the quality q0 of the product engineered by the the innovator.
10The case of the Nikkei Put Warrants introduced by Goldman, Sachs & Co. in 1990 illustrates these factors very
well.
11Robert Hauswald and Robert Marquez propose a model where banks improve the technology for screening loan
applicants to give them a ﬁrst mover in the loan market (Hauwald and Marquez, 2003).
14Even though we have illustrated product expertise as multidimensional, we prefer to treat a as
a scalar. We believe that making a a vector does not add any important insight, while treating it
as a scalar keeps our exposition parsimonious.
4.1 Learning by the Imitator
Before the new security is issued the ﬁrst time, the precision of the imitator’s information about
the security engineering parameters a is also A−1.A f t e ro b s e r v i n gt h eﬁrst deal completed by the
innovator or any later deal underwritten by himself or by the innovator, the imitator is able to
update his information about a. In other words, the imitator observes a noisy signal z1, which
reveals information about a. Even if the design of the innovative security is disclosed publicly after
the ﬁrst deal, the leakage of information about a is only partial and the imitator’s signal has an
additional normally distributed noise η1 relative to the innovator’s information:
z1 =( a + ε0)+η1,
where E(η1)=0 , and Va r(η1)=Σ−1. Note that Σ is the precision of the imitator’s signal beyond
the incompressible component (a + ε0), i.e., how much is revealed after each deal is completed and
a signal is extracted. Let τ1(t) be the imitator’s precision or his product quality after observing t
deals. The quality diﬀerential between the products is equal to the diﬀerence in precision:
∆q(t)=τ0 − τ1(t)






We prove this Lemma in the appendix. The quality diﬀerence decreases and converges to zero










15The imitator’s entry coincides by deﬁnition with the realization of his ﬁrst deal. The dynamics
of the quality advantage, allows us to characterize the timing of the entry. The probability of entry
becomes positive as soon as ∆q(t) becomes smaller than s.A sl o n ga s∆q(t) > 0, the innovator has
a higher probability of getting the next deal. This advantage of the innovator is decreasing in time.
It follows from (5) that his expected advantage disappears faster if the initial advantage ∆q(0) is
smaller and switching costs s are bigger.
The dynamic pattern of ∆q is crucial to distinguish the predictions of this model from models of
horizontal diﬀerentiation only. If imitation is perfect, the loyalty of the client base may still provide
the required incentive to innovate, as in the model of Bhattacharyya and Nanda (Bhattacharyya
and Nanda, 2000). However, switching costs alone predict that imitation is immediate and that
the expected market shares are stationary.
An important measure of the innovator’s advantage is the number of deals after which his
superior initial expertise is reduced by half. This measure of the “half life” of the advantage is






4.2 Subsequent Generations of Products
In some equity linked securities we observe that the design of some products relies on earlier ones.
In particular, new generations are improvements of their older versions. We incorporate this feature
to the model as an improvement in the upper bound of the quality τ of the previous products.
Suppose that a bank invents a product that is an enhancement of an earlier product charac-
terized by quality τ. We assume that this enhancement improves the quality by τ0 that the new
product has maximum quality of
τ + τ0
After a new product that relies on earlier ones is issued, the second generation process of
learning-by-doing can start. For this generation, the competing banks (innovators and imitators)
start to acquire knowledge from the precision of the earlier generation, τ (the prior art). For
16example, Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock, or DECS (Figure 4), are a second generation
innovation derived from the PERCs.12
The security design of subsequent generations is not as innovative as the design of the elders.
In other words, the maximum potential value that a new security adds to its issuer is decreasing
in the generation number of the security. This implies that
τ0 <τ









a given generation’s product quality gap is larger than the quality gaps of the products of later
generations.
4.2.1 Speed of Entry
The number of deals done by the innovator after which the imitator closes his ﬁrst imitative deal
is a random variable that depends on how innovative or hard to imitate is the original product.
More precisely, consider the probability distribution that the imitator closes his ﬁrst deal anytime
after N − 1 deals closed by the innovator. This is a cumulative probability function equal to:
Pr(N)=1− ΠN−1
t=1 (xt)
where xt is the probability that the innovator closes the t-th deal, i.e.:
















Since for every t, ∆q(t) is increasing in the initial advantage ∆q(0), than for every N, Pr(N)
decreases in ∆q(0). This implies that:
12Subsequent generations of convertible preferred stock are ACES and PEPS. ACES convert one to one mandatorily
after 4 years, but ﬂooring and capping the appreciation of common. PEPS convert mandatorily one to one after 4
years only if the common stock appreciates more than a threshold return.
17Proposition 1 The probability distribution of the time of entry of the imitator at or after the
N-th deal is ﬁrst order stochastically dominated by the distribution of the time of the entry when
the initial expertise advantage is larger.
This implies, for instance, that the expected time of entry of an imitator is lower the lower the
initial disadvantage. This stochastic dominance can be veriﬁed in the data by comparing the sample
distribution of the times of entry of competitors across subsequent generations of innovations within
the same family. Indeed, as we argued later generation products should have lower initial expertise
advantages relative to earlier ones.
4.2.2 Equilibrium Market Shares
The expected market share of the innovator after M deals plus the monopolistic deal (t =0 )i s :
MS0 (M)=
Ã
























The expected market share of the innovator is always larger than the expected market share of the
imitator and the diﬀerence decreases with the “age” of the security, i.e., with M :










Since ∆q(t) ≤ s for t ≥ N then, at any given period M, if the innovator’s expertise is higher or if
the speed of learning of the innovator is smaller or if the switching cost are smaller, then the market
share of the innovator becomes relatively larger than the imitator’s. This happens for two reasons.
First, the possible entry of the imitator happens later (after more deals are underwritten by the
innovator, i.e., a larger N). Second, even after the “entry” of competition, the probability that the
imitator obtains the deal in any given period is smaller (larger ¯ x). Clearly, MS0 (M) − MS1 (M)
converges to zero.
18Proposition 2 If next generation products are associated with decreasing incremental innovations
then market share convergence occurs faster for later generations.
5 The Incentives to Innovate
Let N be the ﬁrst deal that the imitator can get with positive probability. Thus, N solves











This threshold N is higher the higher the expertise advantage of the innovator and the smaller the
switching cost (client loyalty) and slower the information spillover (learning of the imitator).
The total expected proﬁts from innovating must account for four terms: the development cost,
the expected proﬁts from the ﬁrst deal, the expected proﬁts from the periods where the expertise
advantage still allows to drive out competition with certainty, and the expected proﬁts in the
presence of competition:
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The innovator’s total proﬁts and his incentives to innovate increase with his initial expertise ad-
vantage ∆q(0) and decrease with Σ, the amount of information that the imitator learns after every
deal underwritten for that security by any bank.
The total expected proﬁts from imitating account the expected proﬁts from the period when













The imitator’s total proﬁts decrease with his initial quality disadvantage ∆q(0) and increase with
Σ.
Since the innovator’s proﬁts decrease in Σ, they have incentives to innovate in markets where
the precision of the updating process by imitators is smaller. In other words, they will innovate
where imitators can extract less information from observing each deal. Such will be the case of
highly volatile markets, where the changes in the economic environment will prompt changes in the
engineering of each deal, given the product design. This clouds the inference that imitators make
about the optimal mapping of the deals’ parameters. Innovation should be more frequent in volatile
markets not because in such a context ﬁrms demand new risk hedging products but because banks
have bigger ﬁrst mover advantages.
In this model the innovator does not have a choice of when to introduce the new product.
Clearly, if an innovator develops a new security he may wait to market it when the demand for the
product is high. In the context of this model, the innovator may have the design ready but may
wait until the client who is in the market is one that can be charged the highest underwriting fee.
Since clients are drawn independently, the innovator’s equilibrium proﬁts increase if the ﬁrst deal
is with a more loyal client, i.e., a client closer to location 0. Thus, an innovator with a new security
design has an incentive to wait until his most loyal client is in need of ﬁnance.
Waiting for the most loyal client can be too costly if there is a risk that other competitors
may come up with the same innovation. Thus, an underwriter with a new design has incentives
to market the innovation to its most loyal client base. Alternatively, banks may tailor the design
of their innovations to suit best the needs of their most loyal clientele. For example, the design of
their products may be destined to meet the targets of their client’s capital structure, or their needs
to save taxes.
205.1 Speed of Innovation
We argued above that later generation products typically rely more on prior art and hence can be
imitated faster and more accurately. One implication of this was that the half-life of the innovator’s
advantage is shorter for later generation products. Also in general next generation products are
improvements on previous ones. Thus, the actual life span of a security design depends on the
speed at which the next generation arrives.
To understand how the life span of a security depends on its generation number, consider
this simple setup. Assume that in each period any given bank has some exogenous probability
of discovering a later generation security, namely the improvement over the current one. Let the
probabilities be δ0 and δ1,w h i c ha r ed i ﬀerent in general, for innovator and imitator. We can think
that δ0 >δ 1 because the innovator has an expertise advantage in the engineering of the current
product that gives him a lead in the research and development for a later generation product. The
probability that some bank innovates in any given period is
1 − (1 − δ0)(1 − δ1) ≡ δ.
With later generation products, the initial advantage in product engineering of the innovator
over the imitator decreases. In this same spirit and for the same reason we can assume also that the
one period chance that the imitator is able to develop a new improved product, δ1, gets closer to
the innovator’s chance, δ0
13. This implies that the probability that an improved security is created,
δ, is increasing in the generation number. Since the earlier product is replaced (“cannibalized”) by
its improvement, we have that later generation products should last on average less or be replaced
faster. Indeed, if δ0 and δ1 are constant within a generation, then the expected number of deals
(or, alternatively, time periods) before a given product is replaced is 1
δ.14We conclude that later
generation products last less, i.e., that new products arrive faster or after less deals of the previous
13The distribution of the time of innovation is geometric. Thus, if an event can occur independently every period
with a constant probability p, then the expected number of periods before this event occurs is p
−1.
14We can also allow for δ0 and δ1 to increase with every deal. This would speed up the introduction of next
generations even more.
21ones.
Note that, all other things constant, imitators can enter the market faster for later generations.
However, the shortening of the life cycle of later generation securities decreases the chances that
imitators complete their ﬁrst deal. Thus, while it is true that, conditional on being imitated, later
generations are imitated faster, it is not clear whether we should see more or less frequent imitation
in later generations. If the expected life cycle of a security shortens faster (slower) than the expected
imitation time, then we would expect less (more) imitation later in a sequence. This is an empirical
issue that we explore later in the paper.
6 Client Base Heterogeneity and Reputation Eﬀects of Innovation
We assumed that the potential clients were uniformly distributed on the unit interval to explore a
situation where no bank had an advantage over the other prior to the creation of the new security.
After the innovation comes to life the innovator has an advantage over the imitator that eventually
fades. In fact, with uniformly distributed clients the situation in the long run returns to the equal
sharing of the market, just like before the innovation occurred.
In this section we depart from that equal advantage benchmark and explore the dynamics of
the ﬁr s tm o v e ra d v a n t a g ew h e nt h et w oc o m p e t i t o r sd on o th a v eac l i e n tb a s eo ft h es a m es i z et o
begin with. To model this in a simple way, we assume that clients are distributed on the unit line
according to a density function of the following kind:
fα (x)=αxα−1 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
where α is a positive real parameter. This type of distribution is a subclass of the beta family and
it allows us to capture the following features. For α<1 the innovator (located at 0) has a client
base advantage. For α>1 the imitator has the client base advantage and for α =1we are back in
the uniform benchmark case of equal client bases. Note that despite the non-uniform distribution,
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´
− ∆q for ∆q<s .
where πe
0 − πe
1 = ∆q + s1−α
1+α.
Proposition 3 A larger initial clientele of the innovator relative to the imitator, results in higher
innovator’s proﬁts from the new security and lower proﬁts from imitation.
This proposition is proved in the appendix. From it we learn that the initial client base can
have an important eﬀect on the incentives to innovate. Everything else being equal, it may not
be proﬁt a b l ef o rab a n kw i t has m a l l e rinitial client base to develop a new product that will later
be imitated, whereas it may be proﬁtable for a bank with a larger initial client base. As a result,
banks with larger client bases should innovate more often.
The above argument brings us to the relation between innovation and reputation. It is often
argued that in the ﬁnancial sector there are returns to being a leader rather than a follower. Many
ﬁrms prefer to be clients of a bank that innovates more frequently that other banks. This eﬀect can
be captured in this model if we assume that every innovation makes α decrease. If the potential
developer of a new cutting edge product can expand its client base, i.e., gain additional clients to do
other regular with as a result of enhanced reputation, then it has an additional incentive to develop
the product. Not only that, this innovation-reputation eﬀe c to nt h ec l i e n tb a s ec a nf e e db a c ko n
itself and spur even more innovation. If a bank by creating a new product can later increase its
client base for future innovations, it will have higher expected proﬁts from its next innovations,
because he will be serving a larger initial potential set of clients.15
15Morgan Stanley’s dominance in convertible preferred stock in the early and mid nineties is a notable example
consistent with this prediction.
237 Empirical Evidence Related to the Model
7.1 Summary of Predictions
Here we address how the predictions of the model are consistent with the evidence found in the
issues of corporate derivatives. The implications of the model that can be tested empirically are:
Prediction 1 The market share for the innovator’s variety of the product is larger than for an
imitator’s and the diﬀerence is decreasing with time.
Prediction 2 If an innovation is an improvement (i.e. is a later generation) of a previous one,
the market share advantage of the innovator is smaller and decreases faster than the earlier
generation.
Prediction 3 Later generation securities are imitated faster than earlier generations.
To test these predictions we use data from the Securities Data Company’s on-line databases of
ﬁnancial transactions. We use all the private and public oﬀerings of equity-linked and derivative
corporate securities in the New Issues database and record characteristics such as the name of the
issuer, the principal issued, the name of the underwriter and the dates. There are 665 of such
issues from 1985 until December of 2002 and involve 51 diﬀerent securities (innovations) by 30
diﬀerent lead underwriters. Not all banks compete in all products markets, so there are 98 diﬀerent
bank-security couples. As we argue above, the complexity of the design of corporate derivatives,
rather than standard debt or equity, makes it more appropriate to evaluate the predictions of a
model with diﬀerent expertise between underwriters. We also refer to the results of the empirical
study by Schroth, that uses the same database (Schroth, 2003), and by (Tufano, 1989).
The model also predicts that later generation products are shorter lived. We verify empirically
whether this is true or not.
247.2 Product Groups and Sequences of Innovations
Schroth classiﬁes Equity-Linked securities into product groups (or “families”) and generations
within these groups (Schroth, 2003). We consider each one of the 51 diﬀerent corporate deriv-
atives in the SDC database as an innovation since for each one there is a unique feature that
distinguishes it from everything that already existed. Each security has its generation number,
which is their order of appearance within its product group. The innovator of a security is the lead
underwriter of the ﬁrst oﬀer ever. Any other bank underwriting deals using the same security is
called an imitator.16
Panel A of Table 1 compares the 11 diﬀerent product groups for corporate derivatives. Some
innovations spur the development of further improvements while others do not. Families with
the largest number of improvements (later generations) have been those of convertible preferred
equities, and the tax-saving perpetual or convertible securities. Innovations in more standard debt
products (RISRS) or zero-coupon convertible debt (LYONS) brought about relatively large and
long lasting underwriting markets but do not seem to have provided a fertile ground for subsequent
development. The second and third columns of this table suggest that product groups with longer
sequences of innovations seem to be associated with more competitors and more innovators. These
are expected features of a fertile product group, in which during the sequence more information
about the products would have diﬀused from innovators to potential competitors.
7.3 Evidence on Market Share Dominance
>From Tufano’s study, it is clear that the innovator’s average share of underwriting of all the
deals done with his innovation is larger than any of the imitators’ average share (Tufano, 1989).
Thus, our ﬁrst prediction is veriﬁed for all corporate securities innovations between 1971 and 1989.
16Innovative corporate products are classiﬁed by Schroth using a compilation of articles in Investment Dealers’
Digest, American Banker, Dow Jones Newswires and others found using the ABI Search Engine (see Schroth, 2003).
For every product, there is at least one description in these databases and a reference to an older product which
was similar to it. Tom Pratt writes a descriptive article in the Investment Dealer’s Digest of almost every corporate
security invented.
25Using the equity-linked and corporate securities data, Schroth (2003) estimates the demand for
the innovators’ and imitators’ varieties at any point in the securities life cycle. In ﬁrst place, he
conﬁrms that, on average the market demand for the innovator’s variety is bigger than for the
imitator’s in an arbitrary time period. This is a more direct test to our model since it is actually a
consistent estimation of the demand function rather than a consistency check through the observed
the market shares.
Schroth’s study also measures the innovator’s advantage over time. Our second and third
predictions are also veriﬁed by this study: the diﬀerence between the innovator’s and the imitators
demand is decreasing in time, and the time required for convergence is smaller for later generations.
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the results of these two studies.
7.4 The Speed of Imitation and Product Life
Prediction 3 states that imitation is expected to be faster in later generations. Figure 5 plots the
empirical cumulative function of the speed at which a security is imitated. The speed of imitation is
measured by the number of the deal, in chronological order, at which a given security was imitated.
The dotted line is the CDF corresponding to those imitated securities that were ﬁrst generation
products, i.e., the ﬁrst product in a sequence of related innovations. The solid line is the CDF of
the speed of imitation of products that appear in the sequence after the ﬁrst generation. In this
ﬁgure we can see that the empirical CDF of the speed of imitation for late generation securities
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the one for ﬁrst generation securities, conﬁrming the increased
speed at which the former are imitated.
To get a more precise assessment of the speed of entry across diﬀerent generations, we ﬁta
hazard rate model where the survival time is the time in days before a given security is imitated.
We construct a panel that consists of all the deals from the second to the ﬁrst imitation of each
imitated security and associate the time elapsed between each deal and the ﬁrst one to time invariant
covariates included in the following speciﬁcation:
λi =e x p {−(β0 + β1 ∗ generation numberi + β2 ∗ expected size of the marketi + ε)}; (7)
26where λi is the probability that security i is imitated immediately after time t (measured in days)
given that it has not been imitated by time t. We use several proxies for the expected size of the
market for a security: the size of the ﬁrst deal ever, the moving average size of all deals before the
observed deal, and the size of the previous deal before the observed one. The larger the expected
market, the larger the incentives that imitators would have to introduce their varieties faster. We
estimate the parameters β0,β1, and β2 by maximum likelihood, and their estimated standard errors
are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and correlation within securities in the same
product group. The baseline hazard rate is determined by ε and to compute our estimates we must
choose its probability distribution. We ﬁt the model for three cases, i.e., Weibull, Exponential and
the Log-normal.
The best ﬁt of our model happens under the Log-normal assumption. We report the estimates
for this case in Table 2. The ﬁrst column in Panel A shows the benchmark estimates for the
parameters in (7), omitting the expected market size control. A higher generation number is
associated on average with a larger hazard rate, and thus, with a faster expected time of imitation.
T h ee s t i m a t ei ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 99% level. The joint hypotheses that all
parameters are zero is also rejected. All the other columns show the results when we use diﬀerent
proxies for the expected size of the market before imitation happened. The estimates and the
inference performed with them are the same when we use the size of the ﬁrst deal, the average size
of all deals before prior or the size of the previous deal as proxies. In all these cases the sign of
β1 remains negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with at lest 95% conﬁdence. We use also
as proxies the total size of the market and the total number of deals. Again, the results regarding
β1 do not change but the proxies are insigniﬁcant themselves, most likely because they are ex-post
measures that do not measure well the expected market size before imitation took place.
The Log-normal assumption implies that the baseline hazard rate, namely the instantaneous
chance that a security is imitated conditional on not having been imitated before, is initially zero
and increasing. Its good ﬁti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ef o l l o w i n gi n t u i t i o n :ceteris paribus,i ti si n i t i a l l y
very hard for a competitor to imitate a new security, yet as time passes it becomes easier for
27competitors to come in the market with an imitation. By contrast, the ﬁt of the model under the
Exponential and Weibull assumptions is poor: the joint hypotheses that all parameters are zero
under such assumptions cannot be rejected. In these cases the implied baseline hazard rate is time-
invariant (exponential) or decreasing in the whole time domain (Weibull). Indeed, the Weibull (or
exponential) hazard rates imply that imitating a security becomes harder (or does not get easier)
with time, which is counter-intuitive. The estimation using other distributions belonging to the
generalized F class also give positive results. Since these hazard rates have shapes increasing as
in the Log-normal case all estimates and goodness of ﬁt measures are basically the same as in
the Log-normal case. The latter results are not shown here for parsimony, but are included in a
supplement to this paper. Figure 6 illustrates the survival probabilities, i.e., the probability that a
security has not been yet imitated, implied by the estimates of the lognormal model.
Panel B shows the estimated median times to the arrival of the ﬁrst imitative deal, conditional
on the generation number of the innovation. We compute these estimates at four diﬀerent measures
of the sample distribution of the average of all deals before the entry of imitators: all the quartiles
and the mean. We use the parameters in the fourth column of Panel A. The estimated time of entry
of imitation is given by 1
e λ. At the median of the previous deals average size, the median imitation
time is almost a year. The median imitation time decreases to just over six-months by the ﬁfth
generation. At the third quartile, the times are much smaller. For example, a tenth generation
security’s predicted median time of imitation is less than two months. This is also depicted in
Figure 7.
Table 3 summarizes further characteristics of early and late generation products. The ﬁrst row
conﬁrms a result found by Schroth: the innovator’s market share is larger for a ﬁrst generation
innovator than for later generation innovators (Schroth, 2003).17In consistency with the previous
results, the second row of Table 3 shows that later generation products, if imitated, are imitated
17The measure of market share used here and by Schroth (Schroth, 2003) is the number of deals that a given bank
has underwritten within a product or within a product group divided by the respective total number of underwriting
deals. Note that the measure is not the share of the underwritten principal. Implicit is the assumption that the
amount to ﬁnance required by an issuer is given at the time it has to choose its underwriter.
28on average much faster than early generation products.
In Section 5.1, we argue that the predictions of the half-life of the innovator’s advantage across
generations could not be veriﬁed from the data because a product typically disappears because a
next generation replaces it. Thus, the observed number of deals is rather a measure of the speed of
next generation innovations. The instantaneous probability of discovery of the next innovation by
either bank should decrease along the sequence of innovations if next generations were marginally
decreasing improvements of quality of the previous ones, and if banks acquired more expertise
about the product class. Table 3 shows how the life cycle of ﬁrst generations and later generations
diﬀer. Measured by the total number of deals, it is clear that products that improve on the ﬁrst
generation are, on average, shorter lived.
We have seen that imitation occurs faster in later generations if the product is imitated. We may
still ask why are some products imitated while others are not. In fact, only 18 of the 51 innovations
in this sample were imitated. Table 4 addresses this concern by showing the distributions of
imitated and non-imitated products conditional on whether these are a ﬁrst or a later generation
product. First generation products are signiﬁcantly more likely to be imitated than later generation
products. In fact, we can reject the null hypothesis of no association between the imitation and
the generation number with a conﬁdence level of 95%. Most likely, this is because later generation
products become shorter lived and thus it is less likely to see that an imitator completes its ﬁrst
deal, even if it takes less deals for him to do so.
7.5 Who are the Innovators?
Investment banks that have large clienteles may have a captive market for their new corporate
products and this may provide stronger incentives to innovate. In fact, if switching costs were the
only source of monopolist rents then we would expect the same banks to innovate very frequently
along the sequence. Further, if innovation increases the reputation of a bank as an underwriter, the
eﬀect of initial clientele on the incentives to innovate are magniﬁed, predicting a persistence in the
selection of the innovator: banks that develop the ﬁrst generation would be more likely to continue
29developing improvements, while other banks are always “relegated” to the role of imitators.
T a b l e5s h o w st h a t ,o nt h ec o n t r a r y ,as i g n i ﬁcant share of the later generation innovations are
done by banks that did not develop the group’s ﬁrst generation. This table takes the 61 combi-
nations of groups and banks in the data and shows how the number of innovations is distributed,
conditional on the banks being the group innovator or not. Of the 50 banks that were not the
group innovator, 22 innovate at least once after the ﬁrst generation has been introduced. More
precisely, of the 39 innovations that appear after the ﬁrst generation, 33 are not introduced by the
group innovator.
7.6 Further comments
Besides switching costs and expertise advantages, we ﬁnd in the literature one more explanation of
why patents are not necessary for ﬁnancial innovation. Vikram Nanda and Yeongkul Yun argue that
banks coordinate their R&D eﬀort and act as a research joint venture to overcome the free-riding
incentives that ultimately eliminates the incentives to innovate(Nanda and Yun, 1995). We believe,
however, that this hypothesis does not apply to our data set and the types of securities described
in this paper. In ﬁrst place, our data set and theirs have only one security in common. Second,
of the 665 underwriting deals using equity-linked and derivative corporate securities only 13 are
underwritten jointly by two lead underwriters. In fact, only once has the underwriting leadership
ever been shared in the ﬁrst issue of a security.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have argued that the development process of new corporate products endows
innovators with superior expertise in the structuring of deals for potential issuing ﬁrms. This
feature is consistent with some stylized facts in the ﬁnancial innovation literature. Namely, that the
innovator has, ceteris paribus, a market share advantage in the market developed by his innovation,
and that this advantage disappears with time. Beyond the existing evidence (Tufano, 1989, Schroth,
2003) we presented additional evidence on innovations developed more recently. The evidence on
30innovations in equity-linked and corporate derivative products allowed us to identify families of
innovations and diﬀerent generations within them. We noticed that the innovator’s advantage was
smaller and shorter lived for later generations products. Our model is consistent, not only with
the existing static evidence, but also with the dynamic patterns that the equity-linked securities
innovations exhibit.
The expertise advantage of the innovator that emerges from this evidence makes the innovation
more proﬁtable. The innovator is more likely to recoup the development cost and have a positive
proﬁt from the innovation despite the absence of patent protection. The resolution of the State
Street Case, in which the US Supreme Court decided to uphold a patent for a ﬁnancial business
method in 1999 has caused an arms-race-like run on patents by securities ﬁrms (Lerner, 2000 &
2004), which has received substantial press coverage recently. State Street may have provided
unnecessary additional incentives to spend in R&D besides raising signiﬁcantly the legal costs of
patenting every new product often for mere defensive reasons. Wether State Street may have
introduced welfare improving incentives as well is too early to tell. The eﬀects of State Street on
the amount of innovation and its proﬁtability for investment banks remain to be seen and then
studied.
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33Appendix 1: Proofs
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That is, the imitator updates the normal distribution of his estimator of a using the signals
from each observed deal and Bayes Rule, and the posterior precision of the imitator after t deals,





Since the developer receives the signal z0 =( a + ε0) and hence has precision:
τ0 = A + τ






P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . In all cases the innovators one period proﬁts are decreasing in α.A
small α that is a higher initial client base generates higher revenues from the innovation. Similarly

















34Appendix 2: The case of more than one imitator
To extend the model to more imitators, we consider here the case of two imitators and the
innovator that are located at the extremes of an equilateral triangle (Figure A2.1). The extension
to more than two imitators can be done in a similar way, e.g. we would consider a tetrahedron for










Figure A2.1.: This ﬁgure illustrates the type of imperfect competition in the model extended to
two imitators. Issuers lie inside an equilateral triangle according to their degree of loyalty to either
bank. The three underwriters are located at the extremes, and the position of an issuer relative
to the three determines the loyalty ranking and intensities to either. The closer is the issuer to a
given bank, the smaller is x2 + l2, the more loyal it is to it and the more costly it is to hire any
other bank as its underwriter
Since the two imitators have the same quality, the imitator farthest from the issuer never obtains
the deal. Thus, without any loss of generality (WLOG) we can always consider for any issuer only
the competition for an underwriting mandate between the innovator and the imitator which is
closest to the issuer. WLOG assume that the issuer happens to be located on the left part of the
triangle, so the competition is between the innovator and the left-hand side (LHS) imitator. The
values to the potential issuer located at x =( x,l) in the picture of choosing the innovator or the
35left hand side imitator (LHS) as an underwriter are respectively given by:
u0(x)=q0 − p0 − sd(x,0),
u1(x)=q1 − p1 − sd(x,1),








Let ˆ x(l) be the location of the client indiﬀerent between choosing either whenever both oﬀer a
deal at marginal cost; i.e., p0 = p1 = c. The indiﬀerent client ˆ x(l) solves the equation
p
x2 + l2 −
q
(1 − x)
































2. Indeed, by deﬁnition the hyperbola is the locus of all points in the plane that have
t h es a m ed i ﬀerence between the distance to two ﬁxed points. In our case,the foci are (0,0) and
(1,0) and the diﬀerence:
∆q
s .
We need to show now that the innovator’s region of inﬂuence, i.e., the region of clients that will
choose the innovator, is increasing in the innovator’s relative advantage, ∆q. A l lt h er e s u l t so ft h e
two competitors case follow in this case if the previous statement is true. To see that it is, note
that an increase in ∆q in equation (8) while l is kept constant required a higher ˆ x(l) to preserve
the equality. Hence, a higher expertise advantage implies a larger region, i.e. a higher probability
to get the next deal. Figure A2.2 below s h o w st h i sc o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c si n∆q by representing the
half equilateral triangle with the innovator at (0,0) and the LHS imitator at (1,0).










Figure A2.2.: This ﬁgure shows the thresholds locations for diﬀerent values of the innovator’s advantage
relative to the magnitude of switching costs.
∆q
s is set to 0,0.2,0.5, and 0.8. Issuers to the right of each
line choose the innovator as their underwriter and issuers to the right hand side choose the imitator. The
innovator’s clientele increases with the size of his initial expertise advantage.
The hyperbola arches in the picture represent the thresholds to the left (right) of which the
innovator (the LHS imitator) can obtain the deal. These thresholds move to the right the higher is
the quality advantage of the innovator, that is, for any given l, a larger advantage implies a larger x.
The benchmark case of no expertise advantage (∆q =0 )gives the constant solution or degenerate
hyperbola ˆ x = 1
2. If the innovator’s quality advantage is high relative to the clientele eﬀect, i.e.
∆q
s > 1, then the “indiﬀerent” client curve lies outside the unit interval in the x axis, which means
that the innovator gets the next deal for sure. Still, the presence of the potential imitator puts a
bound on the markup that the innovator can obtain.
Figure A2.3 below shows how the three ﬁrms have the same market share equal to 1/3 if there is
no quality advantage (dotted lines). Whenever the innovator has a quality advantage (continuous













Figure A2.3.: This Figure shows the areas of potential issuers that each bank can attract. The dotted
lines denote the areas with equal sharing of the market, when the innovator does not have an advantage










PERCs (Preferred Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock)
 - Innovator: Morgan Stanley, 6/1991.
 - Imitators: Merryll Lynch, Dean Witter.
 - Mandatory Conversion in 3 years.
 - High dividend yield (>8%)
 - r between 25 - 40%.
Figure 2: The conversion ratio of Preferred Equity Cumulative Stock (PERCS) as a function of the
returns of the underlying common stock.
Figure Captions
Figure 1: This ﬁgure illustrates the type of imperfect competition in our model of the market of corporate
underwriting. Issuers lie along a unit interval according to their degree of loyalty to both banks. The two
underwriters are located at the extremes, and the closer is an issuer of type x to a given bank, the more
loyal it is to it, i.e., the more costly it is for the ﬁrm to hire the other bank as its underwriter.
Figure 2: This ﬁgure plots the conversion rate of a Preferred Equity Redeemable Stock (PERCs), as
a function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred stock converts
mandatorily after 3 years to one unit of common stock unless the stock appreciates above a cap of r percent.









Figure 3: Probability of obtaining the deal of Innovator and Imitator
such that their conversion value is that of a stock that has appreciated by r percent.
Figure 3: This ﬁgure plots the probabilities that the next underwriting deal will be signed by either the
product innovator or its imitator. The next client that will be in the market seeking to sign an underwriting
deal is drawn a random from a uniform distribution. The solid line plots the probability that the client
chooses to deal with the innovator, as a function of the diﬀerence between the quality of the underwriting
provided by the innovator or the imitator. The dashed line plots the probability that the client chooses the
imitator as its underwriter. Ceteris paribus, if the innovator and the imitator can oﬀer the same quality
underwriting then the probability that either gets the next deal is 0.5. If the quality diﬀerential is higher then
the probability that the innovator gets the next deal increases (and the imitator’s probability decreases). If
the quality diﬀerential is high enough, any client will prefer the innovator, and the probability that he gets
the next deal is one.
Figure 4: This ﬁgure plots the conversion rate of a Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock (DECS),
as a function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred stock converts






DECS (Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock)
 - Innovator: Salomon Brothers, 6/1993.
 - Imitators: Lehman Brothers.
 - Mandatory Conversion in 3 years.
 - Lower dividend yield.
 - r between 20 and 22%.
0
Figure 4: The conversion ratio of Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock (DECS) as a function of
the returns of the underlying common stock.
If the common stock appreciates within these boundaries in 3 years, then DECS convert to less than one
unit of common such that their conversion value is that of the stock’s price at the issue date.
Figure 5: This ﬁgure plots the empirical cumulative function of the speed at which a security is imitated.
The speed of imitation is measured by the number of the deal, in a chronological ordering, at which a
given security was imitated. A security is said to be imitated if a banker diﬀerent from the innovator also
underwrites corporate issues using the same product structure. The dotted line is the CDF corresponding to
those imitated securities that were ﬁrst generation products, i.e., the ﬁrst product in a sequence of related
innovations. The solid line is the CDF of the speed of imitation of products that appear in the sequence
after the ﬁrst generation.
42Figure 5: Plot of Empirical Cumulative Density Functions for the Speed of Imitation Conditional
on the Generation Number of the Product
Figure 6: This Figure shows the probabilities that a security is not imitated before t days as from the
date of its ﬁrst issue. The probability that imitation time, N, occurs after t, i.e., the survival rates S(t)=
Pr(N>t ), are measured in the vertical axis and shown as a function of time, which is shown in the horizontal
axis. These are given by S(t)=Φ(−1
e σ ln(b λt)), where b λ is the estimated imitation hazard rate, which is
itself obtained from the estimated hazard rate model b λ =e x p ( −6.297+0.133∗generation+0.002∗mean
size of prior deals), and b σ =1 .273907. The thick solid plot corresponds to ﬁrst generation securities. The
thin solid plot corresponds to second generation securities. The dashed plot corresponds to 5th generation
securities and the dotted plot to 10th generation securities.











Figure 6: The probability that a security is not imitated before date t after its ﬁrst issue, con-
ditional on the generation number of the innovation. The thick solid plot corresponds to ﬁrst
generation securities. The thin solid plot corresponds to second generation securities. The dashed
plot corresponds to 5th generation securities and the dotted plot to 10th generation securities.













Figure 7: The median times of imitation as a function of the generation number of the security,
estimated using a lognormal duration model. The thick solid plots the median times when we use
the 1st quartile of the sample distribution of the size of the ﬁrst deal of the security. The thin solid
plot uses the median. The dashed plot uses the mean and the dotted plot uses the 3rd quartile.
45Figure 7: This Figure plots the estimated median times of imitation as a function of the generation
number of the security. The median predicted time is shown on the vertical axis (Med t) and the generation
number, g, on the horizontal axis. The estimated median times, c M,are given by 1
e λ, where b λ is the estimated
imitation hazard rate, which is itself obtained from the estimated hazard rate model b λ =e x p ( −6.297 +
0.133 ∗ generation +0 .002 ∗ mean size of prior deals). The thick solid plots the median times when
we use the 1st quartile of the sample distribution of the size of the ﬁrst deal of the security. The thin solid
plot uses the median. The dashed plot uses the mean and the dotted plot uses the 3rd quartile.
46Table 1: Evidence on Innovation and Imitation from Previous Studies
P a n e lA :S u m m a r yo ft h eC l a s s i ﬁcation of Equity -Linked
and Other Corporate Derivatives (source: Schroth, 2003).
Product Group Number of Products Number of Number of
(i.e., Generations) Distinct Innovators Underwriters
1. Debt Products 1 1 2
2. Convertible Debt (Zero Coupon) 1 1 3
3. Convertible Debt (Dividend Paying) 2 2 2
4. Convertible Preferred Stock 15 8 15
5. Short-term, Income-Deferring Products 1 1 4
6. Perpetual, Income-Deferring Products 9 4 9
7. Convertible, Income-Deferring Products 7 5 10
8. Index-Tied Principal Appreciation 8 5 8
9. Stock Tied-Principal Appreciation 4 4 6
10. Privatization Exchangeable Debt 1 1 1
11. Corporate Pass-throughs 1 1 1
Panel B
Summary of Evidence on First-Mover Advantages by Corporate Securities Innovators
Study Description and Methodology Eﬀect of Selected Variables
1. Tufano (1989) Regressions of underwriters historical
product market shares on
reduced form exogenous variables, including:
- a dummy variable for the innovator Positive and Signiﬁcant
2. Schroth (2003) Instrumental Variables estimations of the
issuers choice for an underwriter.
Choice depends on controls and:
- an innovator dummy Positive and Signiﬁcant
- innovator dummy interacting with time Negative and Signiﬁcant
- innovator dummy interaction with time
and generation number Negative and Signiﬁcant
47Table 2: Regression Analysis of the Duration before Securities are Imitated
Panel A
The dependent variable is the time in days elapsed after the ﬁrst deal of the security was made.
The estimated Hazard Rate Model is: −lnλ = β0 + β1 ∗ generation+ β2 ∗ expected market size + ε
All estimates are computed with 48 observations of 18 imitated securities.
The distribution of ε is Lognormal.
Base Proxy for expected market size: proceeds (in US$ M) of
Model First Previous Mean of all Total of all Total number
deal deal prior deals deals of deals
Constant 5.822 6.296 6.299 6.297 5.895 6.079
(0.192)∗∗∗ (0.433)∗∗∗ (0.240)∗∗∗ (0.385)∗∗∗ (0.223)∗∗∗ (0.314)∗∗∗
Generation Number -0.130 -0.140 -0.130 -0.133 -0.137 -0.142
(0.047)∗∗∗ (0.061)∗∗ (0.062)∗∗ (0.063)∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗∗
Expected Market Size -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -5.75e-06 -0.009
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (6.45e-06) (0.007)
χ2 Wald statistic 7.57∗∗∗ 7.88∗∗ 41.63∗∗∗ 9.64∗∗∗ 12.00∗∗∗ 33.010∗∗∗
Panel B
Hazard Rate: λ =e x p ( −6.297 + 0.133 ∗ generation+0 .002 ∗ mean size of prior deals)
Median time of First Imitative Deal: M = 1
λ
Generation Median Time, evaluated at size of average prior deal =
Number 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile
1 400.97 331.15 288.38 213.48
5 235.28 194.31 169.21 125.26
10 120.83 99.79 86.90 64.33
15 62.05 51.25 44.63 33.04
Each observation in Panel A consists of the time in days after innovation at every deal before the ﬁrst
imitation paired with the generation number and the proxy for the expected market size. The panel
includes all 18 imitated equity-linked and derivative securities between 1985 and 2002. The parameters are
estimated by maximum likelihood, and the estimates of their standard errors are shown below them in
brackets. These estimates are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and within product group
correlation. Estimates followed by ∗∗∗ are signiﬁcant to the 0.01 level, by ∗∗ to the 005 level, and by ∗.to
the 0.1 level.
48Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Speed, Duration and Innovator’s Market Shares for the Innov-
ative Equity-Linked Securities
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median
1. Market Share of Product Innovator First Generations 7 0.74 0.27 0.82
Later Generations 11 0.55 0.27 0.60
2. Speed of Imitation First Generations 7 4.86 2.48 4
(deal number of ﬁrst imitation) Later Generations 11 2.91 0.83 3
3. Product Life (measured in deals) First Generations 11 19.81 28.16 9
Later Generations 39 11.39 18.47 5
The Market Share of the Product Innovator is the number of deals underwritten by the security
innovator divided by the total number of deals underwritten with that security. The Speed of
Imitation is the issue number (in chronological order) of the ﬁrst deal by an imitator of a
given security. The Product Life is the total number of issues(underwriting deals) of a given
security.
49Table 4: Distribution of Imitated and Non-Imitated Products, Conditional on their Generation
Non-Imitated Products Imitated Products Total
1. First Generation Securities 4 7 11
36.36 63.64 100.00
2. Later Generations 29 11 39
72.50 27.50 100.00
Pearson χ2 = 4.9332; P-value: 0.026
There are 51 securities, 11 of which are a ﬁrst generation product (one per group). The Pearson
χ2 statistic corresponds to the test whose null hypothesis is that there is no statistical
association between the two binary variables. The ﬁrst row at each numeral shows the data counts;
the second the row percentages.
50Table 5: Distribution of the Number of Innovations by Banks Competing in Each Product Group
Number of Innovations in the Product Group
Type of Banks 0 1 2 3 4 Total
1. Not the Group Innovator 28 16 3 1 2 50
56.00 32.00 6.00 2.00 4.00 100.00
2. Group Innovators 0 8 1 1 1 11
0 72.73 9.09 9.09 9.09 100.00
There are 61 bank-product group observations. 11 correspond to those banks that
developed the ﬁrst generation in each group. The rest correspond to any other bank
that competed in the group, either as an imitator or an innovator of later generations.
The ﬁrst row at each numeral shows the data counts; the second the row percentages.
51